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SUMMARY 
The degradation of topsides process piping on an offshore platform carrying oil and gas 
can result in undesirable events like bursts and leakages. In order to manage the 
challenges arising from such failures, the piping is regularly inspected using different 
types of Non Destructive Testing (NDT) methods. Since this piping has different 
configurations and is often located in places that are difficult to access, the associated 
costs of these activities are quite high. To support the decision-making on the 
development of an effective and efficient inspection programme, Risk-Based Inspection 
(RBI) analysis is often used. Based on the recommendations of the RBI analysis, the 
inspection is carried out and the results of the inspection are then reinvested into the 
inspection management programme to update the analysis.  
 
This thesis presents a methodology based on Bayesian updating to formally ensure that 
experience and knowledge are used in a systematic way, when deciding how much 
needs to be inspected in order to be convinced that the corrosion group of components 
does not contain any significant corrosion. It is expected that the implementation of the 
methodology will improve the inspection management by providing a systematic tool to 
incorporate the inspection results, provide traceability and reveal critical assumptions. 
This thesis will also present a method for how to evaluate and communicate different 
uncertainty factors.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Inspection management is one of the important tasks in an offshore installation, because 
several accidents have taken places due to insufficient inspection management and 
corrosion of critical equipment. Topside piping is therefore regularly inspected to ensure 
a safe and reliable operation. This inspection planning is often based on the concept of 
Risk-Based Inspection, RBI. This analysis will help in identifying areas where there are 
high consequences if a leak or rupture occurs and where there exists a probability of 
failure, PoF.  
 
Deciding the probability of failure is a challenging task. Sometimes the PoF is based on 
expert judgements, but is often calculated using established degradation models, but 
these models often turn out to be quite conservative. Inspections are therefore used to 
reduce the probability of failure. The inspection of topside equipment is expensive to 
carry out, and should consequently be kept to a minimum. This raises the important 
question, how much is necessary to inspect in order to reduce the risk to an acceptable 
level? What should this decision be based on, and how can the decision be justified? 
Should it only rely on expert opinions or is it possible to find methods that can be used 
as decision support?  
 
The purpose of the RBI analysis is to find an effective inspection plan, which intends to 
maximise the availability of assets at an acceptable cost without compromising on 
safety. The inspection plans today are often quite conservative, leading to high 
inspection costs. Still, knowledge can reduce the uncertainty, and inspections are 
therefore required. However, when do we know enough to stop inspecting?  
 
 
1.2 Aim of the Thesis 
 
The aim of this thesis is to give an answer to the above-mentioned question: when do 
we know enough about the piping’s condition to stop inspection? In other words, how 
much is it necessary to inspect in order to feel secure about the condition of the piping? 
This thesis will develop a method that can be used as decision support when trying to 
answer this question. The method used will also secure a systematic treatment of new 
inspection results and combine those with all the available background knowledge.  
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1.3 The Scope of Work 
 
This thesis will look into the use of Bayesian updating as decision support. This is a 
method that can be used to decide the number of inspected hot spots necessary to 
achieve the required confidence of the condition in a large corrosion group. In order to 
apply this method a flow chart will be presented.  
 
The need for an extended RBI analysis, where uncertainty factors are identified and 
evaluated, will be presented.  
 
The second part of the thesis presents the strengths and weaknesses of Bayesian 
updating and guidelines to successful (right) usage of the method.  
 
1.4 Limitations 
 
The main limitation of this method is the introduction of a parameter θ, which can only 
be given a meaningful interpretation as long as the number of hot spots in a corrosion 
group is high or it is possible to imagine a large number of hot spots. This method 
focuses on deciding whether or not significant corrosion is present; if significant 
corrosion is present, other methods should be used to decide the need for measures or 
more inspections.  
 
 
1.5 Organization of the Thesis 
 
This thesis contains five chapters with several different sub-chapters. The first chapter 
gives an introduction to the thesis, the background, aim, scope and terminology. The 
next chapter will present the knowledge which is necessary, in order to understand the 
procedure introduced in Chapter Three. Chapter two will also give an introduction to 
uncertainty factors, and how they can be treated. Chapter Four will provide a discussion 
regarding the procedure presented in Chapter Three, while Chapter Five will give a 
short conclusion.  
 
1.6 Terminology 
 
The terminology used in this thesis is in accordance with the terminology presented in 
Aven (2008, 2010).  
 
Risk definition: Combination of an event A, its consequences C, and the 
uncertainty U, related to the event and its consequences 
(Aven, 2008). 
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Risk description: (A,C,U,P,S,K). The event A, the different consequences C, 
the uncertainties attached to both A and C, the probabilities P 
(knowledge-based) used to describe U, a sensitivity S to see 
how variation in different input conditions and assumptions 
changes the risk picture, and given the background 
knowledge K. (Aven and Flage, 2009). See Section 2.2.3 for 
an alternative description.  
 
Uncertainty:  Lack of knowledge about a phenomenon.  
 
Aleatory uncertainty: Variation of quantities in a population; for Bayesians, known 
as variation.  
 
Epistemic uncertainty: Uncertainty regarding a phenomenon due to lack of 
knowledge. Bayesians consider this as the only type of 
uncertainty (Aven, 2010). 
 
Probabilities: Knowledge-based judgement about uncertainties, comparing 
the uncertainty of an event/consequence with drawing a blue 
ball, p, out of an urn containing p% blue balls (Aven, 2010). 
Also known as knowledge-based probability. 
 
Chance: The fraction of “successes” if the experiment is repeated 
infinitely under the same conditions.  
 
Expert: Person with in-depth knowledge about a process or 
phenomenon.  
 
Confidence interval: A 90% confidence interval [a,b] for a parameter, θ, means 
that the parameter will be in the interval in 90% of the cases if 
the experiment can be repeated infinitely.     
 
Credibility interval: A 90% credibility interval [θ1, θ2] for a parameter, θ, means 
that the interval contains θ with a probability equal to 0.90. In 
other words, P(θ1 ≤ θ ≤ θ2) = 0.90. 
 
Prediction interval: A 90% prediction interval [a, b] for a quantity, X, means that 
the interval contains X with a probability equal to 0.90.    
In other words, P(a ≤ X ≤ b) = 0.90 where X is an observable 
quantity. 
 
Exchangeable sequence: A sequence of random quantities, where their joint 
distribution functions are independent of the order of the 
quantities in the sequence (Bernardo and Smith, 2000). 
 
Event:  The occurrence of a particular set of circumstances (ISO, 
2002). 
 
Development of a Procedure for Making Inspection Plans for Corroding Oil and Gas 
Piping 
 
 
 
4 
Significant corrosion:  Measurable corrosion with potential to threaten the 
equipment’s integrity. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
2.1 Definitions and Explanations 
 
2.1.1 Risk and Decision Making 
 
Decisions are made every day, some of them more thought-through than others. Some 
decisions are easy, while others are more complex. An easy decision can be identified as 
a decision problem where the consequences of the different decisions are known and 
you have one solution that is clearly the best compared to the others. On the other side 
are the more complex decision problems: decisions where there are no clear 
consequences and where uncertainties also become a part of the problem. Risk 
management becomes an important task when dealing with decision making under 
uncertainty. 
 
When choosing between different decisions one will have to consider the event (A), the 
event’s different consequences (C) and the uncertainties (U) attached to both A and C. 
This is in accordance with the risk definition presented in Aven (2008) and will be used 
throughout this thesis.  
 
In most situations people tend to prefer known consequences. Consider, for example, 
the case where you can choose to get 1000 dollars for sure or you can choose to 
participate in a game where you have the possibility of winning 5000 dollars with a 
chance of 0.4 or nothing otherwise. Some of us, the risk averse, will choose 1000 
dollars, while others, risk seekers, prefer the game where they can win 5000 dollars. Let 
us say that you get the opportunity to participate in a game where you can win 5000 
dollars with a chance 0.9, but you have to pay 1000 dollars to be allowed to play.  
 
This seems like a game where you are almost certain to win, but what if the game is not 
fair? You may wonder why anyone should give you money. Uncertainty becomes a part 
of your decision problem: to play or not to play? You will seek more information in 
order to reduce the uncertainty, and hopefully end up with the “best” solution, a solution 
which is beneficial. Has anyone played this game before? What happened with them? 
Will you be allowed to try the game before you decide to play? Can you trust the person 
offering the game, and so on? 
 
This need for information will always be present when dealing with decision making 
under uncertainty. As will be the case in this thesis, when do we have enough 
information to feel secure about the conditions in the decision problem? In the example 
above, necessary information could have come from people that have already played the 
game or the first impression you get of the guy offering the game, and it may be easier 
to make a decision.  
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2.1.2 Reducing Uncertainty 
 
Probabilities are often used to express uncertainty, but there exist two different 
frameworks for probability. There is a strong need for an explanation of the two 
different types. The classical viewpoint sees probability as a relative frequency, 
meaning that P(A) is the fraction of times A occurs if the situation can be repeated 
under the same conditions infinitely.  
 
Another approach to probability, the one that will be adopted in this thesis, is called 
knowledge-based probability. This probability compares the degree of uncertainty with 
a standard. For example, to compare the uncertainty of an event/consequence with 
drawing a blue ball, out of an urn containing p*100 % blue balls (Aven, 2010), p is then 
the probability.  
 
Before going further, it is necessary to address the ongoing discussion regarding the 
meaning of probability. Statisticians that see probability as a knowledge-based 
judgement about uncertainty are known as Bayesians, while statisticians that address 
probability as a relative frequency are called frequentists. The main difference between 
these two views is the possibility of assigning a probability to a single event.  
 
For frequentists, it is impossible and meaningless to talk about the probability of a 
single event, as they will say that this does not have anything to do with the 
mathematical theory of probability; see Leda Cosmides and John Tooby (1996). 
Frequentists say that a single event can not have a probability as probability always 
refers to a population (like Norwegians or a large amount of marbles).  
 
For Bayesians, on the other hand, probability exists for single events. This is due to the 
fact that they see probability as a personal expression of uncertainty regarding the 
occurrence of an event given the available knowledge. Some degree of knowledge 
regarding the occurrence of an event will always exist.  
 
Leda Cosmides and John Tooby (1996), have in their introduction to “Are humans good 
intuitive statisticians after all? Rethinking some conclusions from the literature on 
judgement under uncertainty”, presented the differences between what they call 
subjective probabilities (also known as knowledge-based probabilities) and objective 
frequencies. I refer to this article for an easy explanation for why Bayesians and 
frequentists disagree. The advantages of being a Bayesian will be discussed in Section 
3.3. 
 
 
2.1.3 Epistemic and Aleatory Uncertainty 
 
Uncertainties are often divided into epistemic and aleatory uncertainty. Epistemic 
uncertainty is uncertainty caused by lack of knowledge, while aleatory uncertainties are 
due to the variation within a population. Aleatory uncertainties are present because the 
system that is being studied can behave differently, and these uncertainties are therefore 
a part of the system. An example may be smokers; you are interested in the average 
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number of smokers in each class at a school. Smokers can be considered as your system 
(population), and the number of smokers in each class can be different from the average 
for the whole school. This variation between the average and the number of smokers in 
one class is referred to as aleatory uncertainty. 
 
Epistemic uncertainties are the only uncertainties that exist when adopting the 
knowledge-based approach to probability, meaning that the only uncertainties that exist 
are due to lack of knowledge; variation in a population/system is just called variation. 
Uncertainty is then something that can be reduced by increasing the knowledge about 
the phenomena that are being studied. Variation can not be reduced as it is a part of the 
phenomena that are being studied.  
 
When doing inspection planning, uncertainties are always present. These uncertainties 
are attached to the consequences, the occurrence and the location of a leak. There are 
several different factors that influence these uncertainties. The consequences of a leak 
have to do with nearby equipment, the content of the piping, the pressure and 
temperature of the content, size of the leak, if ignition sources are present, the 
effectiveness of implemented measures like firewalls, blast walls, fire water and so on.  
 
 
2.1.4 Value of Information 
 
When doing research, new information may become available. This new relevant 
information may change the direction of the research and influence the final conclusion. 
It is therefore important to make sure that new information is processed in a systematic 
way so that all relevant information is considered before a decision is made. Systematic 
coherent treatment of inspection results can be achieved by Bayesian updating. 
Coherent treatment means that the decision process is logical; an example of coherent 
behaviour can be that alternative a is better than b, which is better than c. Then 
alternative a is also better than c; see Lindley (1985).  
 
A well-known concept in risk management is the ALARP principle, meaning that one 
should reduce risk to an as low as reasonably practicable level. In the context of 
inspection management, ALARP will mean that the risk attached to a leak should be 
reduced to a level which is as low as reasonably practicable. Because risk can be 
defined as the combination of the event, a leak, the consequences, like fire or explosion 
and the different uncertainties attached to both the occurrence of the event and the 
different consequences. Consequently, there are three different areas where measures 
can be implemented to reduce the risk. Measures to reduce the probability of the 
occurrence of the event - for a leak, thicker material, corrosion inhibitors and more - can 
be used. Fire and explosion walls can be used to reduce the consequences of a leak, 
while knowledge can be used to reduce the uncertainty. Knowledge can be found when 
performing inspections or by comparing with similar situations and so on, but when do 
we know enough to stop inspecting?  
 
The risk can be considered as high as long as there are large uncertainties attached to 
both the occurrence and the consequence of a leak. Not all the uncertainties can be 
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expressed by a probability. When dealing with corrosion, the uncertainty is mostly 
associated with the actual state of the piping. The consequences are often quite clear, 
and models are developed to calculate the corrosion rate and thereby be able to predict 
the state of the piping. Still, it is important not to forget the different uncertainty factors 
related to the background knowledge; this will be described further in Section 2.2.2. 
 
Nevertheless, inspectors get surprises, both when they find corrosion which was not 
expected and the other way around. The need for inspections is therefore clear, as it 
increases the knowledge about the piping condition and thereby reduces the uncertainty. 
Inspections give more available information and it becomes easier to predict the 
condition of the remaining part of the piping in the corrosion group. Further, inspections 
increase the knowledge and reduce some of the original uncertainty factors; see Section 
2.1.2.  
 
Still, it is important to remember that inspections only increase the knowledge as long 
as the inspection method used is suitable. With a high chance of detection (POD), the 
fraction of times the inspection methods do not reveal any corrosion, even though 
corrosion is actually present, should be low.  Knowledge about how degradation occurs 
is also an advantage to be able to select the inspection points which will give the most 
valuable information.  
 
Following the argumentation that inspections increase the knowledge, one should 
always inspect everything, and in that way remove all the uncertainty. This will be 
extremely costly and the ALARP principle is not being followed. Consequently, an 
important question arises: how much is it necessary to inspect to be sure that you do not 
inspect so much that it ends up in gross disproportion to the costs and benefits of doing 
inspections? In other words, the cost should be weighted against the value and need for 
new information (inspection results).  
 
2.2 Inspection Management 
 
Inspection planning is an important part of inspection management and today is based 
on Risk-Based Inspection, RBI analysis. Inspection management and risk management 
have a lot in common, as both of them strive to control unwanted events and 
consequences. Below are some points that can be used as guidelines when ensuring a 
good inspection management process: 
 
 The inspection management should have an outstanding understanding of the 
system performance. 
 
 The models that are used should be “sufficiently accurate” representations of the 
world; their goodness in describing the world has been evaluated (Aven, 2004). 
 
 All observable quantities are precisely defined.  
 
 The meaning of risk and uncertainty should be consistently treated and fully 
understood.  
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 The background information for the analysis is well documented and available 
to all parts: dose planning, performing and evaluating the inspection. 
 
In Aven (2004), the above-mentioned points are used to highlight the factors necessary 
to ensure a high quality risk analysis. These points are not very different when it comes 
to inspection management and planning. Inspections are performed to reduce the 
uncertainties and mitigate risk related to a leak. A leak may have several different 
consequences, some of which may be very serious with the possibility of several 
fatalities; considering the Piper Alpha accident as an example, see Lord Cullen (1990). 
Inspection management and risk management are therefore related. Inspection 
management based on risk, known as Risk-Based Inspection, focuses the inspection on 
areas where the consequence of a leak is most severe, so it will be possible to act before 
a leak occurs. The following section will give a short description of the RBI analysis, 
and the different uncertainty factors. A description of an Extended RBI analysis, ERBI 
analysis, which includes the uncertainty factors, will be presented in Sections 2.2.2 and 
2.2.3, see also the Appendix.  
 
2.2.1 Risk Based Inspection, Hot Spots and Corrosion Groups 
 
Risk based inspection, RBI, is a framework for determining where, what, how and when 
to inspect in a cost-effective manner, ensuring that safety requirements to personnel and 
environment are fulfilled. When doing inspections, it is normal to inspect locations 
where the condition being discussed is expected to be most severe DNV (2009). These 
locations are called hot spots. Hot spots with the same degradation mechanisms belong 
to the same corrosion group, meaning that the hot spots in this group are exposed to the 
same internal or external environment and made of the same material, thus having the 
same degradation mechanism. These groups should be organised so it is natural to relate 
inspection results in one part of the group to the hot spots in the remaining part of the 
group; see DNV (2009). 
 
The RBI analysis is used to locate the areas exposed to the highest risk and in need of 
inspection. In the RBI analysis, different areas are divided into different consequence 
and probability categories, based on expected values. If the analysis concludes that the 
combination of probability of significant corrosion or erosion and the consequence of 
corrosion/erosion is unacceptable, it is decided that inspection is necessary.  
 
Inspections may also be necessary if some conditions in the piping are unknown or 
insecure. In situations where the consequences of a leak are very high, inspections are 
done to look for surprises or to check assumptions which the RBI analysis is based on.  
Furthermore, when the RBI analysis recommends inspections, the next step is to decide 
how much to inspect. This will, as already mentioned, be the main focus of this thesis, 
and the number of inspections will depend on the acceptable level of uncertainty.  
 
After an RBI analysis has been performed, a time to inspection will be recommended. 
The time is dependent on the probability and consequences of failure for the 
component/corrosion group/system, etc. being studied, but, according to Selvik, et al. 
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(2011), does “fail to bring into account all the relevant uncertainties”. This means that 
all the relevant uncertainties in the RBI analysis are not revealed when only focusing on 
probabilities. Not all uncertainties can be expressed by probabilities; see Section 2.2.2.  
 
In an RBI analysis, one is forced to produce probability estimates to be able to perform 
a risk estimate. When deciding these probabilities (P), different assumptions have to be 
made, and the probabilities that are used are based on the best available background 
knowledge (K). Often the background knowledge is weak, and the assumptions that are 
made are wrong. In some situations an assumption may be “constant sand content of 
two percent”, this assumption is necessary to say something about the piping 
degradation.  
 
A probability for degradation failure is calculated based on this, and the probability is 
used to estimate the risk and thereby the time to next inspection. When presenting the 
probability and time to next inspection, the assumption of two percent sand content is 
often forgotten. When introducing this assumption, an uncertainty factor follows. What 
if this assumption is wrong? Will it influence the time to next inspection (the decision), 
and how much can it change before the time to next inspection changes (sensitivity)? 
 
The example of two percent sand content is far-fetched and in many situations this 
assumption is checked using sensitivity analysis. Nevertheless, there is a need for a 
more systematic approach to handle the different uncertainty factors. Not all uncertainty 
factors are as visible as the one mentioned above; some may be difficult to reveal, and 
experience may be necessary.  
 
Let us take another example. Consider a case where you have a low probability of a 
leak, and the consequence of failure is classified as medium. Low probability of a leak 
is calculated based on degradation rate. This degradation rate is calculated based on an 
assumption: no presence of corrosive sources. The calculation of degradation and, 
following that, the probability of a leak is then conditioned on this very important 
assumption. If the only information that is being communicated to the management is 
that the probability of a leak is low, important information is hidden and the decision 
regarding time to next inspection may be influenced. If one assumes that no corrosive 
sources are present, one will normally not plan for inspection in the first couple of 
years. On the other hand, if corrosive sources are present an expected degradation will 
be calculated and inspection will be planned. If one expects fast degradation, time to 
next inspection will be short to make sure that maintenance is performed before a leak 
occurs. It follows that it is clear that this assumption is important, and should be 
communicated to the management. 
 
This example is a bit far-fetched, but the point is that the background knowledge, often 
expressed by assumptions, may “hide” uncertainty, and these uncertainties are known as 
uncertainty factors; see Selvik and Aven (2011), and Selvik et al. (2011). They present a 
method for how to handle uncertainty factors. The basic concept of this method will be 
presented below. 
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Figure 2.1  RBI process, DNV (2009). 
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2.2.2 Uncertainty Factors in the RBI Analysis 
 
Motivated by the example in the section above, the need for an evaluation of uncertainty 
factors can be justified. In the method presented in Selvik et al. (2011), the assessment 
of uncertainty factors is added as an extra decision support after the traditional RBI 
analysis has been performed. They denote this as an extended RBI analysis: ERBI.  
 
The ERBI analysis is also based on a different risk perspective than the RBI analysis 
presented in DNV RP-G101 (DNV, 2009). The ERBI analysis is in accordance with the 
risk perspective presented in Aven (2010). In this definition of risk, probability is being 
replaced with uncertainty, making probability a tool used to describe uncertainties, 
conditioned on the background knowledge. As a consequence, the focus changes from 
assessing probabilities and expected values to describing uncertainties. Since 
probabilities can not describe all uncertainties, an evaluation of the different uncertainty 
factors is required. 
 
The ERBI analysis follows the same methodology as an RBI analysis, but with a 
broader perspective on risk, as mentioned above. Risk is then seen as a combination of 
the event (A), the consequence (C) and the uncertainties (U) about A and C; see Aven 
(2008). Probabilities, P, are used to describe the uncertainties related to the occurrence 
of A and its consequences C. P is based on the best available knowledge and will 
therefore not be able to describe the uncertainties “hidden” in the background 
knowledge.  
 
The ERBI analysis includes a risk perspective which gives a broader risk picture, and 
includes uncertainties which may be hidden in the assumptions (which are based on the 
background knowledge). These “hidden” uncertainties are called uncertainty factors. 
Including an evaluation of uncertainty factors makes sure that the focus in the RBI 
analysis is on describing uncertainties and not just probabilities, and consequently on 
being able to reduce the occurrence of unwanted situations and surprises.  
 
In addition to a broader risk perspective, the ERBI analysis presented by Selvik et al. 
(2011) presents a potential for methodological improvements, consisting of extended 
uncertainty assessments. The RBI methodology presented in DNV (2009) will still be 
the platform, but the ERBI analysis requires an extended incorporation of the 
uncertainty factors. Some may argue that uncertainty factors are already included in the 
RBI analysis, but a systematic methodology is lacking.  
 
Studies like those of Geary (2002), Herzog and Jackson (2009) and Simpson (2007) 
indicate that uncertainties in assumptions made in the RBI analysis are limited, reflected 
in the final result. None of the above-mentioned articles includes an evaluation of 
uncertainty factors. 
 
Before presenting the methodology for the ERBI analysis, I would like to refer to 
Vinnem (2008). He has performed a case study of an LNG plant located in Risavika, an 
urban area on the Norwegian west coast. He is attaching an assumption which was made 
when evaluating the risk attached to this plant. This assumption says that “in the event 
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of impact of a passing vessel on an LNG tanker loading at the quay the gas release 
would be ignited immediately, presumably by sparks generated by the collision itself”.  
 
Vinnem not only disagrees with the assumption, but he also notes that a treatment of 
this assumption, such as a sensitivity study, is missing? This can be seen as motivation 
for why evaluations of the different uncertainty factors are needed. A change in this 
assumption in the LNG case could have influenced the decision regarding the location 
of the plant. At least the effects of this uncertainty factor should have been investigated, 
according to Vinnem (2008).  
 
2.2.3 Methodology for Extended RBI Analysis 
 
In this section, the ERBI methodology presented in Selvik et al. (2011) will be 
described. As discussed in Section 2.2.2, the method is based on the RBI analysis 
presented in DNV (2009), but includes a broader risk and uncertainty perspective. The 
ERBI analysis is also based on a knowledge-based approach to probability; see Section 
2.1.2. Figure 2.2 presents the framework for the extended methodology as presented by 
Selvik et al. (2011). Steps 0-3 represent the standard RBI analysis, while steps 4-6 
include the new steps included in the ERBI analysis.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Framework for the extended RBI methodology, as presented in Selvik et 
al. (2011). 
 
 
After performing an RBI analysis according to DNV (2009), Selvik et al. (2011) 
recommend an uncertainty analysis, which consists of: 
 
 Identification of uncertainty factors 
 Assessment and categorisation of the uncertainty factors with respect to degree 
of uncertainty 
 Assessment and categorization of the uncertainty factors with respect to 
sensitivity 
 Summarization of the factors’ importance 
 
It follows that the first step is to identify the uncertainty factors. These are factors which 
may come from assumptions made during the risk assessment. The next step is to rank 
Development of a Procedure for Making Inspection Plans for Corroding Oil and Gas 
Piping 
 
 
 
14 
the different uncertainty factors using a score: high, medium or low. This score is 
motivated by Flage and Aven (2009) and, in Selvik et al. (2011), is summarized as: 
 
High uncertainty 
If one or more of the following conditions are met: 
 The assumptions made represent strong simplifications 
  Data are not available, or are unreliable 
 There is lack of agreement/consensus among experts 
 The phenomena involved are not well understood; degradation models are non-
existent or known/believed to give poor predictions 
 
Low uncertainty 
If one or more of the following conditions are met: 
  The assumptions made are seen as very reasonable 
  Much reliable data are available 
  There is broad agreement/consensus among experts. 
  The phenomena involved are well understood; the degradation models used 
are known to give predictions with the required accuracy 
 
Medium uncertainty is defined for the factors where there is a combination of the 
conditions from low and high uncertainty. Consequently, some uncertainty factors end 
up with high uncertainty, but this does not necessarily mean that they will influence the 
risk level and thereby the time to inspection.  
 
The third step in the methodology introduces a degree of sensitivity. As an example, 
take the assumption: no presence of Microbiological Induced Corrosion, MIC. This 
assumption introduces an uncertainty factor, which may have a low, medium or high 
degree of uncertainty. Let us say that the degree of uncertainty is medium, but if MIC 
actually is present, it will influence the final risk level and thereby the time to next 
inspection.  
 
This uncertainty factor therefore has a high degree of sensitivity, as presence of MIC 
strongly influences the degradation rate. The combination of the sensitivity, how much 
the factor is able to change the risk picture (time to inspection), and the degree of 
uncertainty, are interesting in a decision-making context. See Table A and Selvik et al. 
(2011) for an example of how this can be presented. The combination of the degree of 
uncertainty and sensitivity leads to the classification of the uncertainty factors’ degree 
of importance. Uncertainty factors with a high degree of importance should be 
prioritised when the risk picture is being communicated to the management.  
 
Let us introduce an example. Consider an n-year-old platform that is ready for 
inspection. Some of the carbon steel piping is expecting corrosion. It is assumed that all 
piping in a corrosion group is exposed to the same temperature, pressure and internal 
medium.  
 
In this situation, the piping is assumed to be a gas-water-hydrocarbon multiphase 
system which can give uniform CO2 corrosion. According to DNV-RP-G101 (DNV, 
2009), areas where it is expected that water is in constant contact with the carbon steel 
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will be chosen as hot spots, as CO2 corrosion is most likely to take place at these 
locations. In some cases these hot spots may be very good, meaning that they are easy 
to locate. Good hot spots make it possible to feel secure that if corrosion is present in 
the corrosion group, it would at least be present in the hot spots. To make this simple, 
let us present a list of some of the assumptions that will be present when planning time 
to inspection for this corrosion group:   
 
1. Water is in constant contact with the carbon steel 
 
2. Inspection results are representative for the whole corrosion group 
 
3. The operational parameters are constant over time 
 
4. No presence of MIC (microbiological induced corrosion) 
 
All the assumptions listed above represent different uncertainty factors. When 
performing the RBI analysis, the time to next inspection is estimated based on these 
assumptions. 
 
The assessed risk, and thereby time to inspection, will vary if these assumptions turn out 
to be wrong or imprecise. The degree of the changes in the risk picture may be different 
for each uncertainty factor. The uncertainty factor introduced by the assumption of no 
presence of MIC (microbiological induced corrosion), is characterised below as having 
a high degree of uncertainty. MIC may occur if bacteria (from seawater) are present. In 
this example, it is not expected, but it may occur if the sulphate removal package (SRP) 
does not work as intended. MIC has never been detected, as it is often not inspected for 
either, in this corrosion group, but there exists a possibility of MIC corrosion; it is just 
not the most likely scenario. After identifying the different uncertainty factors 
introduced by the assumptions, the different degrees of uncertainty can be determined. 
The different degrees of uncertainty are: 
 
1. Low  Water is in constant contact with the carbon steel 
2. High  Inspection results are representative for the whole corrosion group 
3. Low  The operational parameters are constant 
4. High  No presence of MIC, microbiological induced corrosion 
 
Further, each of these assumptions can be given a degree of sensitivity: 
 
1. High  Water is in constant contact with the carbon steel 
2. High  Historical data are relevant 
3. Medium The operational parameters are constant 
4. High  No presence of MIC, microbiological induced corrosion 
 
The uncertainty factor identified in the assumption regarding no presence of MIC is said 
to have a high degree of sensitivity. This means that this uncertainty factor is able to 
change the decision regarding the time to next inspection. If MIC is present, the 
corrosion rate will be higher, and significant corrosion will most likely occur earlier.  
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After assessing the different degrees of uncertainty and sensitivity, this is combined into 
a degree of importance, as listed below. Uncertainty factors with a high or maybe also 
medium degree of importance should then be communicated to the management. As 
seen in this example, the uncertainty factor which emerged from the assumption of no 
presence of MIC should be communicated to the management.  
 
In many situations the management would ask for more information, like what would 
happen if MIC was present. Uncertainty factors like this are also often being 
communicated today, but not systematically, and the possibility of overlooking 
uncertainty factors “hidden” in the assumptions is present. It is clear that uncertainty 
factors are very important and, if missed, unwanted situations may arise.  
 
Using the method presented in Selvik et al. (2011), the degree of uncertainty and 
sensitivity can be combined into a degree of importance. In this example:  
 
1. Medium  Water is in constant contact with the carbon steel 
2. High Historical data are relevant 
3. Low - Medium The operational parameters are constant 
4. High   No presence of MIC, microbiological induced corrosion 
 
 
When presenting the results from the ERBI analysis, the assumptions with a high degree 
of importance should be highlighted. This is, to some degree, included in the RBI 
practice today. However, one may benefit from a more systematic approach to 
uncertainty factors, as presented in Selvik et al. (2011). The ERBI process is more time-
consuming, but is recommended to be performed when dealing with decision making 
under uncertainty.  
 
After evaluating the uncertainty factor’s importance, the ERBI analysis recommends an 
uncertainty evaluation and presentation. This may give valuable information to the 
management.  
 
The next step in the framework for the extended RBI methodology presents the role of 
managerial review and judgement. This step ensures that the various assumptions and 
uncertainty factors are seen in a broader picture, giving weight to different concerns, 
limitations and boundaries. Management review and judgement also reflect the fact that 
decision making under uncertainty needs to balance different concerns, like risk, cost 
and, in some situations, also reputation. 
 
In this thesis, the focus is on the uncertainties related to factors which influence the 
occurrence and location of a leak. The aim of inspections is to locate these areas before 
a leak occurs. Different methods for calculating corrosion rates have been developed, 
and the input in these methods is based on the piping material, medium, temperature, 
pressure, etc. These calculation models are based on earlier experience and research.  
 
In some cases the degradation rates are either higher or lower than estimated. A central 
assumption when performing inspection planning is the dividing of corrosion groups. 
This assumption includes an uncertainty factor. What if some of the areas in this 
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corrosion group are placed in the wrong corrosion group? This may happen, but 
experience and training may reduce this possibility. Still, it is important to address the 
uncertainty, especially in situations where the consequences of wrong corrosion group 
are high. Often inspection points/hot spots are chosen to reduce the effect of “wrong” 
corrosion group, meaning that areas with the highest consequences are preferred when 
performing inspections.  
 
When planning the time to next inspection, different assumptions are made. Often the 
most conservative assumptions or expected values are used. This may lead to quite a 
conservative calculation of degradation rate, and situations where significant corrosion 
is expected but not revealed during inspection may occur.  
 
Consequently, how much should then be inspected in order to feel secure that no 
corrosion is present? Is it not natural to believe that this should depend on the factors’ 
degree of uncertainty? Section 3.2.2 presents the choice of prior distribution in a 
Bayesian analysis, and how this prior distribution can be used to reflect some of the 
uncertainty. Still, it is important to remember that the prior distribution only reflects the 
uncertainties regarding the fraction of hot spots with significant corrosion (the 
distribution parameter), based on the available background knowledge, and that 
evaluation of the uncertainty factors is necessary.  
 
In Section 1.6 risk is described as the combination of the event A, the different 
consequences C, the uncertainties attached to both A and C, the probabilities P 
(knowledge-based) used to describe U, a sensitivity S to see how variation in different 
input conditions and assumptions changes the risk picture, and given the background 
knowledge K. An alternative to this may be to describe risk using (A,C,Q,K), where Q 
represents the uncertainty. Some of this uncertainty may be presented using 
probabilities, P, while the remaining uncertainty factors are presented when doing an 
evaluation of the different uncertainty factors, UF.  It follows that: 
 
Uncertainty (Q) = P (A|K) and UF 
 
This section has presented an extended RBI methodology, based on the RBI framework, 
but with a stronger and more systematic focus on uncertainties. The ERBI analysis 
highlights uncertainties which may be “hidden” in the assumptions on which the 
analysis is based. This leads to a broader presentation of the risk, in which the 
management will have to evaluate the important uncertainty factors and give weight to 
different concerns like cost vs. benefit (reduced risk). Consequently, this will reduce the 
possibility of surprises and unwanted events. For a more comprehensive example 
regarding the treatment of uncertainty factors, the reader is referred to the Appendix.  
 
2.3 Bayesian Updating 
 
The Bayesian updating process is a well established method for the incorporation of 
new information. There are several books which describe Bayesian updating; this thesis 
will just touch the most basic parts of the theory. For more advanced theory, see 
Bernardo and Smith (2000), Ghosh et al. (2006) or Singpurwalla (2006). Bayesian 
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updating is a strong tool for handling new data, where updating the probability of an 
event has the main focus. For Bayesians, probability is a measure of uncertainty based 
on the available background knowledge. This is different from the relative frequency 
approach to probability, where probability is the fraction of “successes” in the long run, 
as already explained in Section 2.1.2. To Bayesians, the relative frequency of an event is 
known as a chance. The probability of an event, P(A), can change as more data is 
revealed. It is this opportunity to learn from experience that is the known as Bayesian 
updating. The original belief before more data is available, P(A | H), is called the prior 
distribution and is based on (given) the best available background knowledge H. When 
this probability is updated it is called the posterior distribution, P(A| X, H), where X 
represents the new data (observable quantities). The posterior distribution represents the 
probability of event A occurring, given that data have been observed and the 
background knowledge H. Using Bayes’ formula to compute the posterior distribution 
we get: 
 
P(A| X) = c P(X
 
| A) P(A) 
 
where c is a normalizing constant which ensures that the sum (integral) over the density 
equals one. P(X | A) is the probability of X occurring given that A has occurred, also 
known as the chance distribution. H is removed from the equation, but it is important to 
remember that all these numbers are based on the background knowledge. Sensitivity 
analysis can be performed to see how changes in the input data (background 
knowledge) may change the output. 
 
 
2.3.1 Bayesian Inference 
 
Say that there exists a θ which is important for making a good decision. Let H, the 
background knowledge, denote all that is known about θ. More information about θ will 
become available; this new information can be found from the data X = X1,……Xn, 
where Xi represents one observation/measurement. The prior distribution, f (θ | H), 
represents our initial knowledge, uncertainty, about θ. Using Bayes’ formula we can 
calculate the posterior distribution: 
 
f (θ | X, H ) = c f ( X | θ, H) f (θ|H) 
  
Equation 1 
 
As already mentioned, c is a normalizing constant such that the integral over the density 
equals one and f ( X | θ) is the likelihood function of θ given X . Equation 1 can 
therefore be written as: 
 
f (θ | X, H ) = c L(θ | X) f (θ|H) Equation 2 
 
The objective of this updating process is to assess the uncertainty of θ.  
 
Furthermore, it is often the future which is of interest. Starting with a prior distribution, 
updating to a posterior distribution, and further combining this and the law of total 
Development of a Procedure for Making Inspection Plans for Corroding Oil and Gas 
Piping 
 
 
 
19 
probability, finds the predictive distribution. The probability of a future event or 
sequence of events can be written as: 
 
P(X= x) = ∫θ P(X = x | θ) F(dθ) Equation 3 
 
where x is the outcome of the event (or sequence) of interest, F(θ) is the distribution 
function of θ, prior distribution, and P(X = x | θ) is known as the chance distribution of 
X. For simplicity, the background information, H, is suppressed in the equation, but 
should not be forgotten. 
 
Further, let X be a sequence of exchangeable variables that can take the value of 0 or 1, 
a Bernoulli sequence. θ is then the fraction of ones. The predictive distribution can then 
be written as: 
 
P(X1= 1,……, Xk = 1 , Xk+1 = 0,....., Xn= 0 ) = ∫θ θk (1 – θ)n – k F(dθ), Equation 4 
  
 
This is known as de Finetti’s theorem for zero-one exchangeable sequences, meaning 
that if you have an exchangeable sequence of random variables, these variables can be 
handled as if they were independent, conditional on the parameter θ. Exchangeable 
means “a sequence of observations where the joint probability distribution of any finite 
subsequence of observations is invariant under the permutations of the order of 
observations,” Aven (2010, p. 161). 
 
θ
k
 (1 – θ)n – k  is known as the chance distribution and F is the prior distribution of θ, 
which shall represent the knowledge about θ before the new data is observed. The 
selection of prior distribution can vary and is explained further in the next section.  
 
 
2.3.2 Conjugate Analysis and Prior Distributions 
 
The choices of prior distribution are not easy, and much has been written regarding 
them; see for example Ghosh et al. (2006), Bernardo and Smith (2000) or Singpurwalla 
(2006). Different methods for selecting prior distributions can be used: the so-called 
non-informative distributions which intend to reflect total lack of knowledge. For a 
binomial case, the parameter θ (on the interval [0, 1]) will have a non-informative prior 
distribution if a uniform distribution is used; see Figure 3.7. 
 
It can be claimed that there always exists some degree of knowledge about a 
phenomenon or the parameter for which the prior distribution is assigned. As Gudmund 
R. Iversen writes in his book about Bayesian Statistical Inference from 1984, 
“...research is never done in a vacuum, and if nothing were known about a parameter 
we would not have thought of doing research in the first place.” This is absolutely valid 
for the situation which is studied in this thesis. It would not be interesting to know the 
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fraction of hot spots with significant corrosion if we did not know that corrosion existed 
and would cause a leak if not controlled or avoided.  
 
At least it is known that the fraction exists and in theory can take all values between 
zero and one. In most cases we also know more, due to different degradation 
mechanisms, history and research. When this is reflected in the prior distribution, it is 
called an informative prior distribution. A non-informative prior distribution is also 
used in situations where all values of the parameter are considered to be equally likely; 
this means that “an interval of values of fixed length is equally likely no matter where 
the interval is located within the relevant rage of the parameter” Iversen (1984).  
 
Informative prior distributions will be very informative in situations where some 
parameter values can be assigned a prior probability equal to zero. Doing this means 
that certain values of the parameter are absolutely impossible, and no matter what 
evidence (new research) shows, the posterior probability will always be zero. Due to 
this, care should be used when assigning a prior value equal to zero. So, as Lindley 
(1985, p. 104) writes “leave a little probability for the moon being made of green 
cheese, it can be as small as 1 in a million, but have it there since otherwise an army of 
astronauts returning with samples of the said cheese will leave you unmoved.” For a 
more comprehensive discussion regarding the use of prior distributions, see Bernardo 
and Smith (2000, pp. 357-370) or Ghosh et al. (2006). 
 
When trying to find the prior distribution which best describes the available background 
knowledge, informative or not, it is useful to check whether a conjugate prior 
distribution exists. This distribution ensures that the prior and posterior distribution 
belong to the same class of distributions. Consequently, this will make the Bayesian 
updating easier, but a conjugate distribution should only be used in situations where it 
also accurately expresses the prior knowledge. The Beta (α, β) distribution is a 
conjugate distribution for the Bernoulli (n, θ) distribution, which are the distributions 
that will be used in this thesis. The Beta distribution is not only used because it is a 
convenient choice, but also because it reflects the prior knowledge about the fraction of 
significant corrosion in all the possible situations considered in this thesis.  
 
 
2.3.3 Bernoulli and Beta Distribution  
 
A Bernoulli distribution is a discrete distribution function, used in situations where the 
values are either 1, with a chance of success equal to θ, or 0 with chance 1- θ. The 
probability function can be expressed as:  
 
 
The Beta distribution is a continuous distribution where: 
 
10 << θ                                     =x 0, 1 
xxxBr −−= 1)1()|( θθθ        
      
Equation 5 
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Consider a case where you are interested in the probability of drawing a blue ball and in 
the example from Ghosh et al. (2006): 
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where n is the number of drawings and the iX s are exchangeable. The iX ’s are then  
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Due to Bayes’ formula, the posterior density can be written as: 
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Compared to Equation 5, it is clear that this is also a Beta distribution, 
with )(,|( rnrBe −++ βαθ ). Consequently the posterior mean and variance are: 
 
 
  
 
We can then see that the posterior mean is a weighted average between the prior mean 
and the information from the drawings, and that when the number of drawings 
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increases, the weight from the prior distribution decrease. This equation also shows that 
if the alpha and beta values are high, more data are necessary to “move” the prior mean 
value. Thus, if your prior knowledge is strong, this can be reflected by choosing high 
alpha and beta values. Figure 2.3 shows how the beta distribution changes when the 
alpha (α) and beta (β) increase. Figure 2.4 shows how the distribution changes after ten 
drawings (or other new data, like inspections).  
 
Beta Distributions Density, Prior
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
0,25
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
Prior Distribution for Fraction with Significant Corrosion 
α=β=1,2
α=β=2,0
α=β=4,0
α=β=10,0
α=β=20,0
 
Figure 2.3     Different beta distributions, when α = β > 1. 
 
As already mentioned, Figures 2.3 and 2.4 demonstrate that the posterior distribution is 
much more sensitive towards new data when α and β values in the prior distribution are 
low. The density functions are moving towards zero after ten drawings without getting a 
blue ball, (or inspections without significant corrosion). For the prior distribution with 
the lowest α and β values, the posterior mean also becomes lowest after ten drawings 
without getting a blue ball.  
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Table 1 Table 1 presents approximate numbers of prior and posterior mean and 
variance for different values of α and β.   
 
 
 
Beta Distributions Density, Posterior After 10 
Inspections
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
0,25
0,3
0,35
0,4
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
Probability
α=β=1,2
α=β=2,0
α=β=4,0
α=β=10,0
α=β=20,0
 
Figure 2.4 Posterior Beta distribution, after combination of prior distribution and new           
information (i.e. drawings, inspections…). 
 
This chapter has introduced the background of the procedure developed in this thesis. 
The basic concepts of risk-based inspection, uncertainty factors, Bayesian updating and 
 α = β = 
1.2 
α = β = 2.0 α = β = 4.0 α = β = 10.0 α = β = 20.0 
Prior, mean 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Prior, 
variance 
0.07 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 
Number of 
new 
measurements 
10 10 10 10 10 
Posterior, 
mean 
0.10 0.14 0.22 0.33 0.40 
Posterior, 
variance 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.005 
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the beta and Bernoulli distributions have been presented. Chapter three will show how 
this theory can be used as decision support when planning inspections. More figures on 
how the beta distribution changes when more information becomes available will be 
presented in Section 3.1.  
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CHAPTER 3 
DECISION SUPPORT FOR INSPECTION PLANNING 
 
3.1 Application Example 
 
Let us go back to the example presented in Section 2.2.3, where an n-year-old platform, 
ready for inspection, is considered. Some of the carbon steel piping is expecting 
corrosion. All piping that is exposed to the same temperature, pressure, internal 
medium, CO2 content, etc. is put in one corrosion group. In this case the piping is a gas-
water-hydrocarbon multiphase system which can give uniform CO2 corrosion. 
According to DNV-RP-G101 (DNV, 2009), areas where it is expected that water is in 
constant contact with the carbon steel will be chosen as hot spots, as CO2 corrosion is 
most likely to occur at these locations. In some situations these hot spots may be very 
representative, meaning that they are easy to locate.  
 
Sometimes significant corrosion is expected in a corrosion group, but none of them 
reveal any corrosion during inspection. How much should then be inspected in order to 
feel confident that no significant corrosion is present in the corrosion group? During 
inspections there will not be time to perform calculations. This procedure does, 
therefore, give an output which can be used as decision support when deciding the 
number of inspected hot spots if none indicate significant corrosion. This is the method 
intended for situations where significant corrosion is expected but not found.  
 
For situations where significant corrosion is not expected, the inspections will be carried 
out to verify the assumptions which indicate no significant corrosion, and to look for 
surprises. This may be in situations where the uncertainty factors are classified with a 
high degree of uncertainty; see Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3, see also the Appendix. 
Verifying assumptions may reduce the degree of uncertainty.  
 
In situations where significant corrosion is not expected, the probability of significant 
corrosion is low and the method presented in this thesis will require a high number of 
inspections to “prove” that the probability of significant corrosion is even lower. The 
focus when inspecting and not expecting corrosion is not to reduce the probability, but 
to look for surprises or verify assumptions in order to check if the pressure, temperature, 
flow and so on actually are what were expected. Consequently, Bayesian updating will 
not be used before the output from the RBI (preferably an ERBI, see Section 2.2) 
analysis is ready. It is necessary to have a feeling regarding the state of the corrosion 
group and whether significant corrosion is expected before applying this method.  
 
The method presented is based on the theory explained in Chapter 2 and will not be 
repeated. It is important to remember that this method will only be meaningful as long 
as the parameter θ (fraction of hot spots with significant corrosion) can be given a 
meaningful interpretation. It must be possible to define a large population (corrosion 
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group) of similar hot spots. For cases where there are just a few hot spots in the 
corrosion group, other calculations/methods should be used to support the decision 
making, such as increasing the knowledge about the state of the corrosion group by 
inspecting a proportion of the total number of hot spots, and in that way reducing the 
risk to an acceptable level. The updating will not be required, as inspection of, for 
example, two out of four hot spots in a corrosion group will often reduce the risk to an 
acceptable level.  
 
This chapter will present a method, based on Bayesian updating, that can be used as 
decision support when deciding the number of inspections. It will also be explained why 
this method is suitable in uncertain situations. 
 
 
3.1.1 Updating Procedure  
 
Let θ be the real chance of failure, the fraction of times when significant corrosion 
occurs in the hot spots. The value of θ is unknown, but information exists about what 
this value may be. Further, let X=1 if the inspection shows significant corrosion and 
X=0 otherwise. The sequence of zeroes and ones are exchangeable and Bernoulli 
distributed, with parameter θ. The uncertainty regarding the “true” value of θ, can be 
expressed by a beta (α, β) distribution. The choice of α and β values will reflect the 
knowledge about the true fraction of hot spots with significant corrosion. Background 
knowledge can, for example, be found from earlier inspection results, personal 
experience, DNV-RP-G101 (DNV, 2009) and more. 
 
Figure 3.1.1 presents the basic concept of Bayesian updating, which is the theory behind 
the method introduced in this thesis.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.1    Bayesian Updating.  
 
In this method, the data represents the inspection results and can be denoted by (X1, 
X2,…..,Xn)= x ; the prior distribution represents the initial knowledge about θ and is 
described with a beta (θ, α, β) distribution. When assuming that x is exchangeable and 
Bernoulli distributed, Bayes’ theorem can be used to find the posterior distribution. The 
mean value in the posterior distribution can then be expressed as:  
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Equation 10 
 
   
where α  and β  are parameters in the beta distribution, x is the sequence of hot spots, n 
is the number of inspected hot spots and r is the number of inspections with significant 
corrosion. In this situation, r is equal to zero as the method will only be used in 
situations where no significant corrosion is present.  
 
Further, decide the number of inspected hot spots necessary to reduce the probability to 
an acceptable level. In other words, how much data is required to change your initial 
probability of significant corrosion given your background knowledge?. Inspections 
will increase the knowledge about the conditions in the corrosion group and may 
therefore also reduce some of the different uncertainty factors. The requirements with 
regard to the probability, indicating the degree of uncertainty related to the fraction of 
hot spots with significant corrosion, will of course always depend on the consequences 
of significant corrosion. The number of inspected hot spots when there are no hot spots 
with significant corrosion ( r = 0 ) can be calculated: 
 
βα
θ
α
−−= )|( xEn
 
The posterior distribution is found easily as the beta distribution is a conjugate 
distribution for a Bernoulli distribution. The posterior distribution can therefore be 
expressed as a beta distribution with parameters α  and n+β , when the number of 
inspected hot spots with significant corrosion equals zero (r = 0). See Section 2.3.3 for 
more explanation.  
 
To end up with a number of hot spots, one will have to decide a value for )|( xθE . This 
expresses the mean value of θ in the posterior distribution after inspection, conditioned 
on the background knowledge.  The requirement for the posterior distribution may vary 
as the quality of the hot spots may be different. This shows how the method has to be 
used in combination with other available knowledge; different situations will require 
different values of )|( xθE  and )|( xθVar .  
 
Decision problems often consist of different uncertain aspects, and the probability of 
significant corrosion is just one of them. It is also recommended that the consequences 
of a leak and the “quality” of the hot spots are included. The different uncertainty 
factors, which may be hidden in the background knowledge, should also not be 
forgotten; see Chapter 2.2.  
 
Further, in some situations hot spots are easy to locate and one can feel confident that 
they are representing the areas which are most likely to experience significant corrosion. 
The fraction of significant corrosion will often be lower for the whole corrosion group 
compared to the fraction of significant corrosion in the hot spots, at least if the hot spots 
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are of “high quality”. How should one account for this? Listed below are factors which 
could influence the value of )|( xθE : 
 
 Consequence of significant corrosion 
 The “quality” of the hot spots: 
o Easy to find? 
o Do these hot spots represent “worst-case” areas in the corrosion group? 
 
It is not easy to find a solution to the choice of )|( xθE , but it is important to explain 
why one ends up on a certain value of )|( xθE . A sensitivity analysis can also be used to 
see how changes in )|( xθE  may influence the number of inspected hot spots. A value 
of  )|( xθE  should not be used without explaining why.  
 
For simplicity, the consequences are defined as high, medium and low. Areas where the 
consequences are defined as low are often not inspected and will “run to failure”; this 
method will not be needed and should therefore rarely be used in such situations. For 
situations where the consequences are high or medium, the tolerance for uncertainty is 
much lower and the choice of )|( xθE  should reflect this. I am suggesting that the 
output from this method is a sensitivity diagram; see Figure 3.2, which shows how the 
numbers of inspected hot spots influence the degree of uncertainty. When finally 
deciding the number of inspection points, this diagram can be used as support, and the 
reason for inspecting n hot spots can be explained with cost-benefit, “quality” of hot 
spots, consequences of significant corrosion and background knowledge. If the 
uncertainty factors, identified in the ERBI analysis (see Section 2.2), are classified with 
a high degree of uncertainty, a sensitivity analysis can be performed to check whether 
changes in assumptions will influence the number of inspected hot spots. If so, it should 
be communicated to the management, and they should decide if there is a need for more 
inspections.  
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Figure 3.2  Sensitivity diagram, expected posterior value vs. number of inspections 
without   significant corrosion. 
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Figure 3.2 shows how much )|( xθE changes when inspecting more. This figure shows 
that the costs of reducing the probability from 0.10 to 0.05 require many more 
inspections than a reduction from 0.15 to 0.10. This can, for example, be used to say 
that ten inspections are enough as more inspections have little influence on the 
probability while the costs may increase significantly. For situations where the 
consequences are medium and the hot spots are good, (low degree of uncertainty related 
to the assumption of representative hot spots), maybe a )|( xθE of 0.25 means that 
approximately five hot spots will then be inspected.  
 
3.1.2 Selection of Prior Distribution 
 
Selection of prior distribution is known as one of the challenges when using Bayesian 
updating, and the choice of prior distribution which best describes the background 
knowledge can be difficult. In the method presented here, the beta distribution has been 
selected as prior distribution as it simplifies the calculations and gives a suitable 
description of the possible values of θ in different situations. To make this method more 
user-friendly, some prior distributions will be suggested for different scenarios. These 
prior distributions are meant as examples and are all based on a beta distribution. The 
only difference will be the choice of α  and β  values. I will differentiate between five 
different scenarios: 
 
1. Situations where the fraction of significant corrosion is either very high or very 
low.  
2. Situations where the expected fraction is high, but can take all values between 0 
and 1. 
3. Situations where the expected fraction is symmetrically distributed around 0.5. 
4. A uniform prior, where all values of θ are equally likely.   
5. Situations where the expected fraction is low, but can take all values between 0 
and 1. 
 
For situation 1, the prior distribution will be U-shaped, meaning that both α = β  < 0.  
Figure 3.3 shows how different values of α = β  < 0 change the shape of the prior 
distribution, and how α > β  and α < β  both less than zero will influence the prior 
distribution.  
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Figure 3.3    Different Beta Distributions when α = β < 0, situation 1. 
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Figure 3.4 Different Beta Distributions when α > β  > 1, situation 2. High expected   
fraction of significant corrosion. 
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For situation two, where the fraction of significant corrosion is expected to be high, the 
distribution may look as the ones in Figure 3.4. Here the main density of the prior 
distribution is located above 0.5. When choosing this distribution shape, one is 
expecting to find corrosion. A prior distribution like this will haveα  > β  > 1.  
 
If the background knowledge is weak, a distribution, as shown by the yellow line in 
Figure 3.4, could be used. This may reflect situations where uncertainty factors with a 
high degree of uncertainty exist. Still, it is important to remember that even though the 
prior distribution can reflect some uncertainties, it will not reflect all. Important 
uncertainty factors may often be able to change the whole shape of the prior 
distribution. 
 
An example may be that it is assumed that MIC is not present. The prior distribution is 
then selected based on this assumption; the prior distribution will not reflect the 
uncertainty factor related to the presence of MIC (and the other assumptions which 
represent the background knowledge). It will only reflect the uncertainty related to the 
frequency of significant corrosion, given no MIC. See Section 2.2.3 and the Appendix 
for a description of how uncertainty factors can be treated. Still, the prior distribution 
may reflect uncertainty factors related to the relevance and availability of historical 
data. Strong and relevant historical data may be reflected by choosing high alpha and 
beta values.  
 
For situation five, β  > α  > 1, and the expected fraction of significant corrosion is 
based on the background knowledge expected to be less than 0.5; see Figure 3. 5. 
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Figure 3.5    Different Beta Distributions when β > α > 1, situation 5.  
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The values of α  and β  will be hold low as this allows the greatest influence from the 
data. An increase in α  and β  values will, in practice, say that we feel secure regarding 
the true frequency of significant corrosion, and more data are required to prove us 
wrong. Figure 3.6 shows how the prior distribution changes when α  and β  increase 
for a situation where the distribution is symmetrically around 0.5. 
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Figure 3.6    Different Beta Distributions when β > α > 1, situation 3.  
 
For situation four, there is no information which indicates which value of θ is most 
likely to occur. This is a situation which is expected to be rare, as some sort of 
information almost always exists which will say something about the value of θ, the 
fraction of significant corrosion. See Figure 3.7.  
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Figure 3.7     Beta Distributions when α = β = 1, situation 4. Uniform distribution, there is   
no information about θ.   
 
In the following section, a flow chart will be used to explain how the Bayesian updating 
can be utilised as decision support in the decision process when planning for inspection. 
For simplicity, the decision maker will be given five beta prior distributions to choose 
between. These distributions are chosen as they represent different corrosion scenarios, 
and small shape changes in the distribution will not result in huge changes in the 
number of inspected hot spots.  
 
For decision makers familiar with the beta distribution, it is possible to assign their own 
prior distribution. To make this method easy to use and available for decision makers 
without knowledge of how to change the shapes of the distribution, five different 
distributions will be suggested. These five different distributions are based on the 
shapes described in the section above and presented in Figure 3.8. 
 
To summarize this section, the beta prior distribution can take a lot of different shapes, 
and one of them will be suitable when describing the fraction of significant corrosion 
conditioned on the background knowledge for significant corrosion in a specified 
corrosion group. The next section will introduce the posterior distribution and how this 
changes when the number of inspection points increases.  
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Figure 3.8    Beta Distributions for different values of α and β, representing situations 1-5 
for different corrosion scenarios.  
 
 
3.2 Practical Use in Decision Process 
 
First, let us return to the introduction in this chapter. There is a situation in which it is 
expected that the corrosion group will have significant CO2 corrosion. The outcome 
from the ERBI analysis says that this corrosion group must be inspected as degradation 
could have reached its limit; see DNV-RP-G101 (DNV, 2009) for more information. 
There are high quality (representative and easily located) hot spots available, and it is 
expected that the hot spots will have a high relative frequency of significant corrosion. 
The background information therefore indicates that a prior distribution with shapes like 
the ones presented in Figure 3.4 is a suitable choice, using the beta distribution with α = 
4.5 and β = 2 which is also presented in Figure 3.8.  
 
Following the flow chart presented in Figure 3.11, significant corrosion is expected and 
can be explained with the assumptions used in the ERBI analysis. The age of the 
system, the nominal wall thickness, the fact that it is a water-gas hydrocarbon 
multiphase system and so on can be used when explaining why significant corrosion is 
expected. Reasons like this can be found in DNV-RP-G101 (DNV, 2009). The choice of 
prior distribution has already been discussed, and the next step is now to look at the 
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diagram which shows how the probability of significant corrosion is changing as the 
number of inspection points increases. This can be seen in Figure 3.9, situation 2.  
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Figure 3.9     Sensitivity diagram, showing how the updated probability changes when the 
number of inspections changes for different situations.  
 
For this corrosion group, it is considered that the hot spots are easy to locate and that if 
corrosion is present it will be found in the chosen hot spots, located where one expects 
that water is in contact with the metal. A posterior probability of significant corrosion in 
the hot spots equal to approximately 0.3, is considered satisfactory.  
 
 
Consequently, nine hot spots are being inspected. After their inspection, one of them 
reveals significant corrosion. When taking a second look at this hot spot, it is clear that 
water from a valve has been dripping directly onto the hot spot. It follows that this hot 
spot is different; it is removed from the rest of the corrosion group and considered a 
special case. Another hot spot is then inspected. The new hot spot does not show any 
corrosion, and the uncertainty regarding the presence of significant corrosion is reduced 
to an acceptable level. In other words, I am convinced that no significant corrosion is 
present in the corrosion group.  
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Posterior Distribution, After 10 Inspections 
without Significant Corrosion
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Figure 3.10  Posterior distribution for situations 1 to 5 after 10 inspections without 
significant corrosion. Alpha (α) and Beta (β) values updated using Bayesian 
updating.  
 
When following the flow chart in Figure 3.11, it is important to explain each step, and 
why a certain prior distribution is selected. This will make it easier for others to trace 
the decision process and learn from good decisions. It can also be used to check the 
assumptions and find out what went wrong if a leak occurs after inspections.  
 
If inspections do not reveal any expected significant corrosion, actions should be taken 
to find the reason. This will improve the knowledge about degradation mechanisms and 
is an important task after inspections have been performed. The Bayesian updating 
process will allow others to see how an expert has evaluated and weighted different 
information and concerns.  
 
In addition, the process will be transparent and it will be possible for other experts, who 
may disagree with the final result, to reproduce the process and the assumptions that 
have been made. It is easier to discuss different assumptions and see how changes in the 
assumptions may influence the result, than to discuss a number. 
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Figure 3.11    Flow chart which can be used as guidance when deciding the number of      
hot spots to be inspected in a large corrosion group.  
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3.3 Strengths of Bayesian Updating 
 
The method presented above, based on Bayesian updating, provides a strong tool for 
decision making and will be useful in situations where significant corrosion is expected 
but not found. Bayesian updating in general can, of course, be used in many other 
situations, and this is just an example. See for example Aven and Eidesen (2007).  
 
The main advantage of this method is the combination of background knowledge and 
new data, an approach which secures a systematic incorporation and treatment of new 
data and at the same time includes the background knowledge. Consequently, this 
combination makes it possible to use all the experience and background knowledge that 
exist and at the same time allow new data to convince us that the original belief was 
wrong or validate what was expected.  
 
The focus on assumptions and why different actions have been made is also one of the 
strengths of Bayesian updating. All assumptions and reasons for different choices have 
to be addressed. In the method presented above, this is very clear when the reason for 
choice of prior distribution has to be explained. Why is this distribution chosen as a 
representation for the prior knowledge in that situation? Just the focus on this choice 
forces one to evaluate and comment on the background knowledge. Why (for example) 
believe that the presence of MIC will lead to a high probability of significant corrosion?  
 
Furthermore, this will make it possible for someone without experience to look into 
earlier inspection plans and reports and see how experts have evaluated different 
concerns and assumptions. This may be used as training or to explain different 
decisions. It is not only novices who may benefit from this, it will also make the 
decisions traceable. The evaluation of different assumptions in combination with an 
evaluation of the uncertainty factors will prevent important assumptions from being 
hidden. 
 
Moreover, it will be possible to trace a “bad” decision and figure out what and why the 
decision turned out to give unwanted or surprising consequences. If significant 
corrosion is present, but not found, it should be standard procedure to try and explain 
why. Are the models used to predict the degradation too conservative, or are other 
aspects also influencing the lack of corrosion? 
 
In addition to classical statistics, Bayesian statistics addresses what is actually uncertain 
and not a number based on what has already happened. This is an advantage as it 
focuses on the future. We already know what has happened, but we do not know what 
will happen in the future. The already observed data may no longer be representative for 
the future, and Bayesian updating makes it possible to account for this. If something is 
known about the past, it is not necessarily certain that the behaviour will be the same in 
the future.  
 
The next step will then be to look at what is known about the past and what is known 
about the future and then try to combine it into a reasonable estimate, expressed by the 
prior distribution. This is exactly what can be done when assessing the prior 
distribution: keeping what is relevant from the past and combining it with the future, 
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making a prior distribution which reflects the belief and uncertainty regarding the event 
(situation).  
 
Bayesian updating is therefore suitable when performing decision making under 
uncertainty. Still, it should not be used without an evaluation of the different uncertainty 
factors. When communicating the number of inspection points, an evaluation of the 
uncertainty factors should also be addressed. When uncertainty factors with a high 
degree of uncertainty exist, it may be useful to do the Bayesian updating using different 
prior distribution, checking the sensitivity of the uncertainty factor. If changes in an 
assumption result in a very different prior distribution, and following a very different 
number of inspection points, it may be classified as an important uncertainty factor, and 
should be communicated to the management; see Section 2.2.  
 
Beside the other advantages of Bayesian updating mentioned above, it is easy, it does 
not require any difficult calculations and it is not time-consuming. That is why this 
could be used, without difficulty, as decision support when doing inspection 
management.  
 
 
3.4 Challenges with Bayesian Updating 
 
Bayesian updating is a well established method, and the use of this updating process has 
increased in the last couple of years. The formulas used in this thesis are quite simple; 
the combination of the Bernoulli distribution and the conjugate beta distribution has 
made the calculations easy. In other situations where these distributions are not suitable, 
the calculations may become more difficult, and computers that are able to handle 
complicated calculations are necessary. These complicated calculations have often been 
considered as one of the main disadvantages of Bayesian updating; see Bernardo and 
Smith (2000).  
 
The next challenge when using Bayesian updating is the difficulty when deciding the 
prior distribution. How do you find a distribution which reflects your knowledge and 
which is reasonable? This may sometimes be a challenge, but in the method presented 
above the choice of prior distribution is clear.  
 
It is also important to be aware of the limitations when using probabilities to describe 
uncertainties. As mentioned earlier, the choice of prior distribution is based on a set of 
assumptions; the uncertainty factors addressed in these assumptions are not visible if 
not evaluated after performing the standard RBI analysis. Some of these uncertainty 
factors may be revealed when explaining the choice of prior distribution. After 
identifying these uncertainty factors, they should be evaluated as presented in Section 
2.2.  
 
In situations where it is difficult to define the prior distribution, sensitivity analysis can 
be used. A sensitivity study can be used to check whether different choices of prior 
distributions will lead to another conclusion. Different prior distribution may come from 
Development of a Procedure for Making Inspection Plans for Corroding Oil and Gas 
Piping 
 
 
 
40 
different weighting of the background knowledge, trying to see how variation in the 
different assumptions and inputs changes the output.  
 
Another question which may arise is the need for this method. As already mentioned, it 
is no use in introducing θ, if it can not be given a meaningful interpretation. This means 
that θ, interpreted as the long run frequency of exchangeable 0 and 1s, should exist. 
There is a need for a large number of hot spots in the corrosion group, in order to use 
the method presented above. Not all corrosion groups consist of a large number of hot 
spots, and the standard Bayesian approach, like the one presented here, should not be 
used. There is no need for a method like this as long as there are only a few hot spots in 
the corrosion group.  
 
What happens in situations where the corrosion group contains a small number of hot 
spots? The important assumption of a large number of hot spots will not hold. What can 
be done if the Bayesian updating method leads to a number of inspected hot spots which 
is above the number of available hot spot in that corrosion group? It should not be 
necessary to inspect all the hot spots to reduce the uncertainty to an acceptable level. 
Should it not be good enough to inspect 80% if the acceptable probability of significant 
corrosion is 0.2? 
 
50??spotshot  available ofnumber                 
spotshot  available ofnumber 
spotshot  inspectedy probabilit Acceptable <=
 
 
As already mentioned, Bayesian updating is based on the use of a likelihood function 
and the prior distribution. When using this updating based on new information, one may 
forget an important aspect: does this new information fit into the first assumed models, 
or does some of the information indicate that your models are absolutely wrong or 
misleading? If updating is done without checking the assumptions, important 
information may be lost. As Aven (2010) writes: “In many cases, though, new 
information requires a rethinking of the whole information basis including the 
uncertainty assessments and the modelling, and Bayes’ theorem is not appropriate.”   
 
This may happen when it is suddenly discovered that a group of hot spots in the 
corrosion group is very different from the rest; maybe those hot spots should be divided 
into another corrosion group. If the updating process is being followed without paying 
attention to the assumptions and the available knowledge before inspection, valuable 
information may be lost.  
 
Another issue which may be addressed as a challenge when using Bayesian updating, is 
the need for a knowledge-based probability. Someone may claim that this probability is 
difficult to assess, and that the numbers are arbitrary if produced by persons without 
statistical training. On the other hand, Jennifer Lynn Lee has written a very interesting 
master thesis about Bayesian Reasoning Method for Intelligence Using Natural 
Frequencies. She discusses the benefits of using Bayesian reasoning and argues that it is 
not difficult for people to assess probabilities as long as they are presented in a way 
which is natural and known.  
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She says that: “Natural frequencies are a way of representing statistical information in 
a way that people without a strong mathematical background can understand.” 
Furthermore, she argues that it is easier to understand 10 out of 100, than 10 percent, 
based on the fact that 10 out of 100 has a reference to a population, while 10 percent is a 
base rate. She also receives support for her statement from Leda Cosmides and John 
Tooby from the Center for Evolutionary Psychology at the University of California, 
Santa Barbara. They have done some research which shows that natural frequencies are 
advantageous because they preserve “important information that would be lost by 
conversion to a single-event probability.”, Cosmides and Toby (1996). I see this as 
similar to assessing probability with reference to a standard, like drawing a particular 
ball out of an urn.  
 
Chapter 3 has presented an example of how Bayesian updating can be used as decision 
support when doing inspection management. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 have presented the 
benefits and challenges when using this method. The following chapter, Chapter 4, will 
present a discussion of the use of Bayesian updating and the introduction of an extended 
RBI analysis.  
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION 
 
The use of Bayesian updating represents a strong tool for the combination of 
background knowledge and new information. Still, it may be a challenge to make sure 
that these numbers are used as decision support and not treated as the “truth”. Bayesian 
updating in combination with an evaluation of the different uncertainty factors will 
secure a systematic treatment of both new information and the uncertainty factors that 
are often forgotten.  
 
After performing an RBI analysis, and preferably an extended RBI analysis, including 
an evaluation of the uncertainty factors, Bayesian updating can be used to find the 
number of inspected hot spots in a corrosion group, and sensitivity studies regarding the 
different uncertainty factors can be performed, making it possible to check how the 
different uncertainty factors may influence the number of inspection points in the 
corrosion group.  
 
In this thesis, the use of Bayesian updating is based on the classification of different 
corrosion groups. Assuming that different areas belong to a specific corrosion group 
introduces an uncertainty factor. In some situations this uncertainty factor may have a 
high degree of uncertainty, due to lack of experienced, new equipment and so on. In 
other situations, the classification of corrosion groups is clear; there is a lot of relevant 
data, research, experience and so on. Still, it is important that this uncertainty factor is 
evaluated; if found important it should be presented and communicated to the 
management. The number of inspection points found from the use of Bayesian updating 
should be communicated and presented in combination with an evaluation of 
uncertainty factors.  
 
Corrosion groups are nothing new in the inspection management process, and dividing 
hot spots into corrosion groups is normally not problematic. It requires insight into the 
performance of the piping and how different factors influence corrosion. Even though 
the process of dividing different areas into different corrosion groups has been done for 
many years and a lot of experience exists, mistakes can still happen. It is therefore 
important to evaluate the feedback from inspection and to re-evaluate assumptions if the 
output from the inspection is different from what was expected.  
 
Furthermore, all uncertainties can not be addressed by probabilities. Uncertainty 
regarding the fraction of hot spots with significant corrosion can be described using 
probabilities. The probability is found conditioned on the background knowledge, 
which may conceal important uncertainty factors, if not identified and communicated. 
There is therefore a need for an extended risk-based inspection analysis which includes 
an evaluation of the different uncertainty factors. Including a systematic treatment of 
uncertainty factors, also using Bayesian updating to check the sensitivity, may reduce 
the possibility for surprises. An example of the importance of evaluation of uncertainty 
factors, which is relevant for this thesis, is the inspection method. This thesis has a 
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focus on the number of inspected hot spots, but if something is wrong with the 
inspection method, performance, equipment and so on, we will not get very far and 
there will be no need to perform Bayesian updating. It is therefore also necessary to 
evaluate the uncertainty factor related to the assumption of suitable inspection methods 
and experienced inspectors.  
 
Dividing the hot spots into different corrosion groups requires a high degree of 
knowledge about the different corrosion mechanisms. Still, even though a lot of 
research has been done on corrosion, there is still uncertainty regarding the state of 
different piping. These uncertainties can have different backgrounds; maybe the 
parameters in the piping have changed, the piping has been damaged due to external 
accidents or maybe something unforeseen has happened. Inspections are also performed 
to check for factors like this, but these uncertainties are difficult to express by 
probabilities. The need to look beyond probabilities is therefore also present when doing 
inspection planning; see Aven (2010).  There is a danger in overlooking surprises when 
only focusing on probabilities.  
 
The use of prior distribution should also be discussed; frequentists will argue that the 
use of prior distribution is based on subjective judgements and should be avoided. As an 
answer to this I refer to Iversen (1984, pp. 66-67) and other Bayesians who remind us 
that the use of classical statistics is also subjective to some degree, like the choice of 
significant level when determining whether or not a null hypothesis should be rejected.  
 
Another aspect is the fact that different priors may lead to different posteriors, at least as 
long as the number of new data is small, but this is not a new problem. People are daily 
arguing about the result of different research, they are interpreting the data differently 
due to their different prior knowledge. Iversen (1984) uses a good example, the main 
point of which is as follows: 
 
A Democrat and a Republican are faced with the same unemployment figure: 
The Democrat says that the figure shows we need more government involvement, 
while the Republican argues that the private sector is doing well and will be 
able to solve the problem.  
 
This is an honest disagreement in which the difference is in the prior knowledge and 
opinion, not in the new data represented by the unemployment figure. The prior 
knowledge should not be hidden, and when deciding the prior distribution this 
knowledge should be clarified and different assumptions can be checked using a 
sensitivity analysis.  
 
It is a lot easier to discuss the prior knowledge, asking whether some information has 
been forgotten or given too little weight, than it is to discuss some produced numbers. 
Iversen states that when forced to express personal knowledge (opinion and biases) in 
the prior distribution, the analysis becomes less subjective. I will have to say that I 
agree; in theory everyone should end up with the same posterior distribution if their 
background knowledge is the same. This may turn out to be difficult, but should not be 
seen as a weakness. The main point is to clarify what your analysis is based on, to make 
sure that your decision process is open and easy for others to understand.  
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This is also what will be the main advantage of the method presented in this thesis: the 
need to explain the initial belief and background of the inspection planning. Why is 
corrosion expected, why do we expect a high fraction of significant corrosion and so on. 
This will make it easier to communicate why inspection is required and also justify the 
amount of inspection points. If one can not come to an agreement on the inputs to the 
analysis, one may use sensitivity analysis to see how the different assumptions influence 
the posterior distribution; maybe it does not even change the output.  
 
Sometimes the background knowledge is poor and a non-informative prior distribution 
is chosen, like the uniform distribution presented in Figure 3.7. In some situations this 
may be a suitable choice, and the numerical values in the posterior distribution will in 
this case be the same as when using classical statistics. Both the posterior distribution 
and classical statistics can be used to calculate confidence intervals, and for the uniform 
prior distribution this will result in the same numerical intervals. BUT the interpretation 
of the interval is completely different and, in my opinion, is also one of the benefits of 
Bayesian statistics and knowledge-based probabilities.  
 
A 90% confidence interval in classical statistics says that these intervals will contain the 
parameter, θ (here “real” fraction of significant corrosion) in 90% of the cases in the 
long run, meaning that you will need a lot of samples and that 90% of the confidence 
intervals from each of these samples will contain θ.  This is a very strange concept, and 
it is very difficult to understand what this actually means.  
 
A Bayesian credibility 90% interval, on the other hand, is an interval where θ lies 
between a and b with a probability equal to 0.9, where a and b are numbers. When the 
Bayesian interval is used to directly assess an observable quantity, it is known as a 
prediction interval (see Aven, 2010), and can also be specified directly using 
knowledge-based probabilities. For situations where the sample size is small, a direct 
assignment of the prediction interval will make more sense than the use of a non-
informative prior or classical statistics as these will result in very wide intervals. 
Observe the new data, and directly assign an interval that has a probability equal for 
example to 0.9 to contain the parameter or quantity of interest.  
 
Chapter 4.4 in DNV RP G101 (DNV, 2009) divides the RBI method into three: 
quantitative, qualitative and semi-quantitative/qualitative. In the quantitative model, 
numerical values can be calculated and traditional classical statistics are used. Next, in 
the qualitative model an expert judgement is used; the numerical values are assigned not 
calculated. Further it says: “However the results are subjective, based on opinions and 
experience of the RBI team, and are not easily updated following inspection.”  This is 
exactly where the method based on Bayesian updating will come in to use; there will be 
no use for a distinction between quantitative, qualitative and semi-
quantitative/qualitative models, as long as the background knowledge is assessed and 
the uncertainty factors evaluated.  
 
A probability is assigned, no matter whether it is based on calculations and estimation 
or knowledge and experience or even a combination thereof. The method in this thesis 
will make it easier to follow just one method, regardless of the type of the available 
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knowledge. Consequently, it will not be problematic to update the probabilities and the 
risk after inspections.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The use of Bayesian updating as decision support will secure a systematic treatment of 
new data, and also make sure that all available knowledge can be used: knowledge that 
can be expressed by expert opinion, historical data, new trends, fraction of hot spots 
with significant corrosion in similar corrosion groups and so on. Furthermore, the 
method results in a coherent treatment of the background knowledge with new 
information, in this procedure represented by new inspection results.  
 
It is important to remember that not all uncertainties can be expressed by probabilities 
and/or prior distributions, and that there is a need for an evaluation of the different 
uncertainty factors. A methodology for incorporation of these uncertainty factors has 
been presented in Section 2.2, and is known as an Extended Risk Based Inspection 
analysis (ERBI).  
 
The method presented in this thesis is standard Bayesian updating, which can be used as 
decision support when deciding the number of hot spots that need to be inspected in a 
large corrosion group.  
 
When introducing the extended risk based inspection methodology, an appropriate 
weight is given to the different uncertainty factors, and the possibility of surprises can 
be reduced. The focus on background knowledge and assumptions secures an open and 
traceable decision process in which it is easy to go back and see what different decisions 
are based on, and why certain actions have been performed.  
 
Further, when presenting uncertainty factors with a high degree of uncertainty or 
sensitivity, the management will get the opportunity to perform the necessary 
judgements and give weight to all relevant aspects in the decision process. It will also 
be possible to check whether changes in the assumptions result in another risk picture 
and thereby a different time to next inspection. Important uncertainty factors are not 
hidden in the analysis, and it becomes the management’s responsibility to choose the 
most suitable decision.  
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CHAPTER 6 
SUGGESTION FOR FUTURE WORK 
 
The method described presented in this thesis is only one application area of Bayesian 
updating, and may also be used when inspecting to determine the degradation, the 
deepest corrosion pit or degradation rate.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Example on Treatment of Uncertainty Factors 
 
When assessing the uncertainty factors, we are interested in the factors which may be 
able to change the probability of a leak and thereby the time to next inspection. After 
performing an RBI analysis, the uncertainty has to be evaluated. This section will 
present another example of how to perform an evaluation of the uncertainty factors, and 
may be skipped if understood after reading Section 2.2.3.  
 
The first step in the evaluation of uncertainty factors is to find the most important 
assumptions and identify the different uncertainty factors. Some uncertainties may be 
partially covered by the use of knowledge-based probabilities in the RBI process. Still, 
probabilities are not enough to cover all the relevant uncertainty. When assessing 
probabilities, the probabilities (P) are based on the best available knowledge (K); these 
probabilities are then conditioned on the background knowledge P(A|K), where A 
represents the event.  
 
Consequently, as mentioned in Section 2.2.3, there is a need for an assessment of the 
uncertainty factors which may be “hidden” in the background knowledge. This section 
will give an example of how some of these uncertainty factors can be treated. The 
reader is referred to Section 2.2.1 or DNV RP-G101 (DNV, 2009) if unfamiliar with the 
standard RBI process.  
 
Consider an n-year-old platform where an RBI analysis has been performed. Assume 
that the RBI analysis is performed using the procedure presented in DNV RP G101 
(DNV, 2009), steps 0 – 3 in Figure 2.2. There follows an evaluation of the different 
uncertainty factors, steps 4 – 6 in Figure 2.2. In some situations, data were insufficient 
to complete a detailed RBI, and conservative assumptions were made. The RBI analysis 
is therefore built on several assumptions, some of them more important than others. A 
list of three assumptions follows: 
 
1. No presence of MIC (microbiological induced corrosion) 
 
2. No CO2 corrosion 
 
3. The evaluated degradation mechanisms are corrosion and erosion. 
 
The first uncertainty factor addressed is the assumption that there is no presence of 
MIC. Corrosion problems due to MIC have so far not been reported from earlier 
inspections. No bacteria analysis/monitoring programme has been performed, and it is 
unknown whether MIC is a present problem. It is known that seawater is present, and 
hence there is a possibility of MIC. MIC may occur if the sulphate removal package 
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(SRP) does not work as intended. However, due to the fact that there have been no 
earlier problems with MIC, it is disregarded.  
 
The second assumption of no CO2 corrosion is built on another assumption, that the gas 
is dry. Even though the water dew point temperature for the hydrocarbon gas is well 
below the normal operating temperature, condensation can occur in low points and dead 
legs. Condensation may also occur in the case of shutdown and other abnormal 
operations.  This represents the second uncertainty factor, that the gas actually is dry 
and hence no CO2 corrosion.  
 
The third uncertainty factor to be addressed is the assumption that all degradation is due 
to corrosion and erosion. Fatigue is not considered as no good detailed methods for 
assessing fatigue exist. The third uncertainty factor is then related to the presence and 
criticality of fatigue.  
 
The first step in the uncertainty analysis is now performed: to identify the different 
uncertainty factors. The next step is then to assess and categorize the degree of 
uncertainty and sensitivity attached to these uncertainty factors. The degree of 
importance can be decided after combining the degree of uncertainty and sensitivity, 
and is presented in Table A.  
 
Table A Uncertainty assessment 
 
Uncertainty factor 
 
Degree of 
uncertainty 
Degree of 
sensitivity 
Degree of 
importance 
Presence of MIC High High High 
Presence of CO2 Medium High Medium - High  
Presence of other 
degradation 
mechanisms than 
corrosion and 
erosion 
High Medium High - Medium 
 
 
The sensitivity is found by looking at the uncertainty factors’ possibility to change the 
time to next inspection. If MIC actually is present, it would have a high influence on the 
time to next inspection. The occurrence of fatigue may also be able to change the time 
to next inspection, as occurrence of fatigue under severe conditions (cyclic stress) 
happens fast and with a high consequence.  
 
Further, it is important to communicate the uncertainty factors with a high degree of 
importance. Uncertainty factor one has a high degree of importance and should be 
prioritized when communicating with the management.  
 
After communicating and presenting the important uncertainty factors, is it up to the 
management to make the final inspection plan. If they find some of the uncertainty 
factors to be very important, they may ask for further analysis or testing. In this 
example, they may want to install a bacteria monitoring programme to be able to detect 
bacteria at an early stage and prevent MIC before it occurs.  
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Managerial review and judgment are important, as these are the people making the 
decisions. When making inspection plans, an RBI analysis is used as support. Table A 
will act as additional decision support in the ERBI analysis work. This gives a 
systematic treatment of the different uncertainty factors and makes sure that the 
management has all the available knowledge. Even in situations where the assumptions 
that are used are conservative, it is up to the management to judge and make decisions. 
The results from Table A may also be used in a Failure Modes, Effect and Criticality 
Analysis (FMECA) process, in which additional columns regarding the uncertainty 
factors and their importance are added. See Aven (2008) for a description of an FMECA 
analysis, also referred to as FMEA (Failure Mode and Effect Analysis).  
 
In some situations very conservative assumptions may lead to high inspection costs. 
Uncertainty factors introduced by these assumptions may have a high degree of 
uncertainty and sensitivity, but will not result in any higher risk. This is due to the fact 
that even though the uncertainty factor has the possibility to change the time to next 
inspection, it will only result in a later inspection date.  
 
Uncertainty factors leading to a higher risk picture are of most importance, but 
uncertainty factors which come from very conservative assumptions may lead to higher 
inspection costs and, in some situations, these costs may become in gross disproportion 
to the benefits (ref. ALARP). The main point with evaluating the different uncertainty 
factors is to make sure that the important factors are presented and communicated to the 
management.  
 
In some situations these important uncertainty factors are related to very conservative 
assumptions, and it should be up to the management to decide whether these uncertainty 
factors are acceptable or not. It is up to the management, and not the team who perform 
the RBI analysis, to decide whether the costs of the extra inspections can be justified.  
 
Step 6 in Figure 2.2, management review and judgement, needs to reflect the fact that 
decision making under uncertainty has to balance different concerns, like risk, cost, 
reputation and so on.  
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